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THE LOTITERY IN UN/TED STATES v
EDGE BROADCASTING CO.: VICE OR VICTIM OF
THE COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE?
A Lottery is a Taxation,
Upon all the Fools in Creation;
And Heav'n be prais'd,
It is easily rais'd,
Credulity's always in Fashion:
For, Folly's a Fund,
Will never lose Ground,
While Fools are so rife in the Nation.
-Henry Fielding, 17321
I. INTRODUCTION
The language of the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution is unqualified: "Congress shall make no law... abridg-
ing the freedom of speech."2 However, the United States Supreme
Court has interpreted the First Amendment to exclude some ex-
pressions from the unconditional umbrella of "freedom of speech."3
1. CHARLEs T. CLOTFELTER & PHHIPJ. COOY, SELLING HOPE: STATE LoTTERIEs
IN AMERICA 215 (1989).
2. The First Amendment states: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assem-
ble and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST.
amend. I. Justice Hugo Black, in Smith v. California, wrote, "I read 'no law ...
abridging' to mean no law abridging." 361 U.S. 147, 157 (1959) (Black, J., concur-
ring) (emphasis in original).
3. In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshir the Court established that "[t]here are
certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and
punishment of which have never been thought to raise any constitutional problem.
These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting
or 'fighting' words-those which by their very utterance inflict injury...." 315 U.S.
568, 571-72 (1942). In an address on the First Amendment and the freedom of
speech at Yale Law School, Justice John Paul Stevens stated:
I emphasize the word "the" as used in the term "the freedom of speech"
because the definite article suggests that the draftsmen intended to
immunize a previously identified category or subset of speech. That
category could not have been co-extensive with the category of oral
communications that are commonly described as "speech" in ordinary
usage. For it is obvious that the Framers did not intend to provide
constitutional protection for false testimony under oath, or for oral
contracts that are against public policy, such as wagers or conspiracies
among competitors to fix prices. The Amendment has never been
(127)
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For example, commercial speech, 4 defined as that speech which
proposes a commercial transaction, 5 has occupied an awkward posi-
tion in the Court's First Amendment jurisprudence. 6 Indeed, until
recently, the Supreme Court maintained that commercial speech
was not protected by the Constitution.7
In 1976, the Supreme Court closed the gap between protected
forms of speech and exempted commercial speech by holding that
the government cannot suppress truthful commercial information.8
In 1980, the Supreme Court decided Central Hudson Gas & Electric
Corp. v. Public Service Commission,9 which established a four-step test
for determining the constitutionality of regulations imposed on
understood to protect all oral communication, no matter how unlawful,
threatening, or vulgar it may be. Thus, it seems doubtful that the word
"speech" was used in its most ordinary sense.
Hon. John Paul Stevens, The Freedom of Speech, 102 YALE Lj. 1293, 1296 (1993).
4. See Karl R. Swartz, Note, Constitutional Law-First Amendment-Protection of Com-
mercial Speech-Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 32 KAN. L. REv. 679, 685-86
(1984) (discussing what constitutes commercial speech).
5. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,
561 (1980). See also David F. McGowan, A Critical Analysis of Commercial Speech, 78
CAL. L. REv. 359, 383-402 (1990) (addressing problems of defining commercial
speech).
6. Daniel A. Farber, Commercial Speech and First Amendment Theory, 74 Nw. U. L.
REv. 372 (1979) (focusing on differences between commercial speech, other
speech forms and First Amendment implications). See also Claudia MacLachlan,
Ad Limits Get Harder to Enact, NAT'L LJ., July 26, 1993, at 1, 29 (cheating commer-
cial speech under First Amendment); see generally Thomas R. Seel, Comment, The
First Amendment Protection of Commercial Speech and State Regulation of Advertising in the
Dental Profession: Parker v. Kentucky Board of Dentistry, 56 U. CIN. L. REv. 1525
(1988) (detailing evolution of commercial speech doctrine).
7. The year 1973 marked the start of the Supreme Court's recognition of con-
stitutional protection for commercial speech. See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh
Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973) (recognizing importance of
distinguishing between commercial speech and other speech forms). In the dic-
tum to Bigelow v. Virginia, the Supreme Court extended protection to the area of
commercial speech; previously, commercial speech was excluded. 421 U.S. 809
(1975) ("[S]peech is not stripped of First Amendment protection merely because
it appears [as paid commercial advertising]."). For a further discussion of Bigelow
v. Virginia, see infra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
8. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748 (1976). A Virginia statute made it illegal for licensed pharmacists to
advertise the prices of prescription drugs. Id. The advertisements were truthful
and contained no misleading information, and as such the statute was held uncon-
stitutional for its suppression of truthful commercial activity. Id. See also MacLach-
lan, supra note 6, at 29 (categorizing Virginia Pharmacy as "Magna Carta" of
commercial speech). For a discussion of the omission of commercial speech from
the protection of the First Amendment, see Note, Freedom of Expression in a Commer-
cial Context, 78 HAuv. L. Rxv. 1191 (1965); Martin H. Redish, The First Amendment in
the Marketplace: Commercial Speech and the Values of Free Expression, 39 GEo. WASH. L.
REv. 429 (1971).
9. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
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commercial speech. 10 The creation of a "definitive" test for com-
mercial speech has not led to consistency in the Court's subsequent
commercial speech decisions.' Court observers were, therefore,
somewhat apprehensive when the Court granted certiorari in three
commercial speech cases in 1993 because of this continuing uncer-
tainty in the commercial speech doctrine.12
One of the cases, United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co.,i 3 con-
cerned the validity of two federal statutes.' 4 Collectively, the stat-
10. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. Commercial speech coming within the
protection of the First Amendment follows a four-step inquiry: (1) it must concern
lawful activity and not be misleading; (2) it must be determined whether the as-
serted governmental interest to be served by the restriction on commercial speech
is substantial; (3) whether the governmental regulation directly advances the gov-
ernmental interest asserted; (4) whether it is not more extensive than is necessary
to serve that interest. Id. at 561-66. SeeJonathan Weinberg, Constitutional Protection
of Commercial Speech, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 720 (1982) (discussing application of Cen-
tral Hudson test). For a further discussion of Central Hudson, see infra notes 82-88.
11. Felix H. Kent, Re-affirmation of First Amendment in Commercial Speech,
N.Y.LJ., April 16, 1993, at 8. First Amendment protection of commercial speech
has been called a "Supreme Court made roller coaster ride," in reference to the
inconsistent treatment of commercial speech cases. Id. Examples of the Court's
inconsistent treatment of commercial speech cases include: Board of Trustees of
the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 474 (1989) (concluding that fourth
prong of commercial speech test requires only that the fit be "reasonable" and
narrowly tailored between means and desired objective); Posadas de Puerto Rico
Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328 (1986) (Ruling it was possible
to reduce the demand for gambling through restrictions on truthful advertising,
moving away from idea that any lawful restriction on advertising must demonstrate
substantial government interest); Central Hudson, 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (clarifying
Virginia Pharmacy's holding and established four-step test to evaluate commercial
speech); Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (holding commercial speech wor-
thy of First Amendment protection as long as it is truthful speech). For a further
discussion of the Court's inconsistent treatment of commercial speech cases in the
Court's recent jurisprudence, see Felix H. Kent, Roundup of 1992, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 18,
1992, at 3.
12. MacLachlan, supra note 6, at 29 ("Given the Court's somewhat erratic his-
tory in commercial speech cases, business lawyers, civil liberties groups and First
Amendment scholars were anxious to see what the Court would do with the three
cases .... "). The three cases decided that year were: United States v. Edge Broad-
casting Co., 113 S. Ct. 2696 (1993), Edenfield v. Fane, 113 S. Ct. 1792 (1993) and
City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1505 (1993).
13. 113 S. Ct. 2696 (1993).
14. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1304, 1307 (1988). Section 1304 provides in pertinent part:
Whoever broadcasts by means of any radio or television station for which
a license is required by any law of the United States, or whoever, operat-
ing any such station, knowingly permits the broadcasting of, any adver-
tisement of or information concerning any lottery, gift enterprise, or
similar scheme ... shall be fined.., or imprisoned not more than one
year, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 1304. Section 1307 provides in pertinent part:
[The provisions of sections 1301, 1302, 1303 and 1304 shall not apply to:]
(1) an advertisement, list of prizes, or other information concerning a
lottery conducted by a State acting under the authority of State law which
3
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utes prohibit the broadcast of any lottery advertisements, but
permit broadcasters to promote state-run lotteries on stations li-
censed to a state which conducts such lotteries. 15 The Court re-
viewed a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit holding the two statutes unconstitutional as applied
to the particular parties in the case.16 The Supreme Court reversed
the Fourth Circuit and found that the statutes were not unconstitu-
tional.17 The Court rejected the lower courts' application of the
statutes on an individual basis.' 8 It held that there was a "reason-
able fit" between the regulations and the governmental purpose
and that the restriction was no broader than necessary to achieve
the government's ends. 19 In reaching its conclusion, the Court cen-
tered on the interest of nonlottery states in excluding behavior con-
sidered "vice activity."20 In dissent, Justices Stevens and Blackmun
is- (B) broadcast by a radio or television station licensed to a location in
that State or a State which conducts such a lottery.
18 U.S.C. § 1307. For a further discussion of 18 U.S.C. § 1304 and § 1307, see infra
note 31 and accompanying text.
15. Edge Broadcasting, 113 S. Ct. at 2698. For a full discussion of this case, see
infra notes 121-72 and accompanying text. Throughout this Note, states with state-
sponsored lotteries will be termed "lottery states" and states without lotteries will
be referred to as "nonlottery states."
16. Edge Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 5 F.3d 59 (4th Cir. 1992), rev'd,
113 S. Ct. 2696 (1993). For a further discussion of the circuit court's holding, see
infra note 38 and accompanying text.
17. Edge Broadcasting, 113 S. Ct. at 2708.
18. Id. at 2706.
19. Id. at 2704-08. The Court determined that the "fit" between the govern-
ment purpose and the statute was not perfect, but was reasonable. Id. at 2705. In
evaluating commercial speech cases, "reasonable fit" is the standard used. Id. See
Board of Trustees of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989) (hold-
ing governmental restrictions require "reasonable fit" between means and ends);
see, e.g., Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S.
328, 339 (1986), In re RtM.J., 455 U.S. 191, 202 (1982); Metromedia, Inc. v. San
Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 505-06 (1981) (plurality opinion); Central Hudson Gas &
Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 565 (1980).
Further, the Edge Broadcasting Court looked at the validity of a restriction not
by its application to a particular case, but by its general application and the general
problem it confronts. Edge Broadcasting, 113 S. Ct. at 2704. For a general discus-
sion of the establishment of the reasonable fit test, see David Rownd, Muting the
Commercial Speech Doctrine: Board of Trustees of the State University of New York v.
Fox, 38 WASH. U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 275 (1990) (denouncing restrictions
placed on commercial speech as highly paternalistic).
20. Edge Broadcasting, 113 S. Ct. at 2706-08. SeeJerome L. Wilson, Commercial
Speech Approaches Full Protected Status, N.Y.LJ., Dec. 27, 1993, at 1, 5. "Vice activity"
is that undertaking which includes gambling, alcoholic beverages, tobacco and
prostitution. PeterJ. Tarsney, Regulation of Environmental Marketing: Reassessing the
Supreme Court's Protection of Commercial Speech, 69 Nonm DAME L. Rv. 533, 546
(1993-94). "Vice activity" has traditionally received special treatment by the Court.
Id. The Court has relied on the idea that the trafficking of the so-called "vices"
may be a danger to the public health, morals and welfare. M. David LeBrun, An-
[Vol. II: p. 127
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questioned the continuing conception of lotteries as "vices," reason-
ing that widespread state support and statistical evidence indicated
that lotteries were no longer out of the societal mainstream.2 1
This Note discusses the Court's decision in Edge Broadcasting in
light of the development of the contemporary lottery system and
the evolution of the commercial speech doctrine. Section II de-
scribes the factual background of the Edge Broadcasting dispute.
Section III provides the legal and historical framework for analyzing
the Edge Broadcasting opinion, tracing the historical development of
lotteries and tracking the evolution of the commercial speech doc-
trine. Section IV considers the Edge Broadcasting opinion. It sets
forth the Court's reasoning and identifies the major features of the
opinion. Section V examines the role played by the modem com-
mercial speech doctrine in the Edge Broadcasting decision. Section
VI discusses the impact of Edge Broadcasting on the future of the
Court's commercial speech jurisprudence.
II. FACTS
POWER 94 is an FM radio station, 22 owned and operated by
the Edge Broadcasting Corporation (Edge) and licensed to broad-
cast from Elizabeth City, North Carolina.23 POWER 94 carries the
dual city identification of Elizabeth City and Virginia Beach, Vir-
ginia, but broadcasts from Moyock, North Carolina, a town located
three miles south of the Virginia and North Carolina border.24
Because of its proximity to the Virginia border, the vast major-
ity (92.2%) of POWER 94's listeners are in Virginia, with the re-
maining 7.8% residing in nine northern North Carolina counties. 25
notation, Validity, Construction, and Effect of Statutes, Ordinances, or Regulations Prohib-
iting or Regulating Advertising of Intoxicating Liquors, 20 A.L.R. 4th 600, 607 (1983).
States may, therefore, prohibit or regulate, in the exercise of their police power,
the advertising of such "vices." Id.
21. Edge Broadcasting, 113 S. Ct. at 2709-11 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
22. Id. at 2702. POWER 94 is a 100,000 watt radio station and utilizes the call
letters WMYK-FM. Id.
23. Id. "A license is required for the operation of a radio broadcasting sta-
tion. The power to license is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Com-
munications Commission (FCC)." C.J.S. Telegraphs, Telephones, Radios, and
Television § 302 (1954). The FCC was created pursuant to the Federal Communica-
tions Act. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1988). For a discussion of congressional intent in
forming the FCC, see American Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 191 F.2d 492 (D.C. Cir.
1951).
24. Edge Broadcasting, 113 S. Ct. at 2702. Edge Broadcasting's (Edge) corpo-
rate offices are located in Virginia Beach, Virginia. Id.
25. Id. In the nine North Carolina counties reached by POWER 94, less than
two percent of the entire population of the state reside there. Edge Broadcasting
Co. v. United States, 5 F.3d 59, 60 (4th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 2696 (1993).
5
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Edge estimates that nearly 95% of its advertising revenues come
from the state of Virginia.26 Edge desired to enhance its advertising
revenues by broadcasting Virginia lottery commercials.2 7 Virginia
has a state-sponsored lottery,28 and aggressively seeks promotional
avenues for its lottery.2 9 In contrast, North Carolina statutes ex-
pressly prohibit the advertising of, and participation in lotteries,
making non-compliance a misdemeanor.30 The applicable federal
statutes collectively prohibit a radio station licensed in a nonlottery
state from broadcasting lottery information."1
The North Carolina area reached by POWER 94's broadcasts is
not isolated from other forms of Virginia-based media.32 Virginia
television stations and Virginia newspapers are accessed by North
Carolinians and all display lottery advertisements on a regular
basis. 33
In 1990, Edge brought suit in the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia.34 Edge challenged the two fed-
eral statutory provisions regulating lottery broadcasts and sought a
declaratory judgment that, as applied to Edge, the statutes were vio-
lative of the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of
26. Edge Broadcasting, 113 S. Ct. at 2702.
27. Id. Due to its inability to air lottery advertisements, Edge "estimates that it
has lost and will continue to lose advertising revenues totalling in the millions of
dollars." Edge Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 732 F. Supp. 633, 635 (E.D. Va.
1990), aff'd, 5 F.3d 59 (4th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 2696 (1993).
28. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 58.1-4001-4028 (Michie 1991). Section 58.1-4001 "es-
tablishes a lottery to be operated by the Commonwealth which will produce reve-
nue consonant with the probity of the Commonwealth and the general welfare of
its people, to be used for the public purpose." Id. at § 58.1-4001.
29. Edge Broadcasting, 732 F. Supp. at 635. "In 1988, the Commonwealth paid
$1,285,141 in advertising costs to the media. In 1989, the Virginia Lottery Board
estimated that those expenditures would reach $2.3 million in that year, including
advertising over seven Hampton Roads radio stations." Id.
30. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-289-291 (1993).
31. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1304, 1307 (1988). See supra note 14 for full text of §§ 1304,
1307.
32. Edge Broadcasting, 113 S. Ct. at 2706. The residents of the nine North Car-
olina counties who may listen to POWER 94 may also listen to television stations
and read newspapers that display Virginia lottery advertisements. Id.
33. Edge Broadcasting, 732 F. Supp. at 635. The Lottery Board purchases ad-
vertising on four Hampton Roads television stations which broadcast to POWER 94
listening areas, as well as, other parts of North Carolina not reached by the radio
station's broadcast. Id. Two major Hampton Roads newspapers have advertising
space dedicated to the lottery and these papers also circulate in the North Carolina
counties touched by POWER 94's signal. Id. Circulation for Virginia newspapers
in Edge's broadcast area was 10,400 daily and 12,500 on Sundays. Edge Broadcast-
ing, 113 S. Ct. at 2707.
34. Edge Broadcasting, 732 F. Supp. at 633.
.[Vol. II: p. 127
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the Fourteenth Amendment. 5 The district court held that the stat-
utes were unconstitutional as applied to Edge and granted Edge the
requested relief.3 6
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC), which exer-
cises jurisdiction over radio licensing, sought review of the district
court's decision in the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit.3 7 In a per cun/am opinion, the Fourth Circuit af-
firmed the lower court's ruling that the statutes were unconstitu-
tional.38 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari,
questioning the manner in which the lower courts had applied
prior Supreme Court decisions on commercial speech.3 9 The
Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit's decision, holding that
the statutes in question passed constitutional muster.4°
III. BACKGROUND
The Supreme Court examined two areas of law in determining
whether the federal statutes in question were constitutional. 41 In
order to understand the Court's opinion, it is essential to look at
the history of lotteries on both the national and state levels, as well
as the development of the doctrine of commercial speech.
35. Id. at 635. For the full text of the federal statutes, see supra note 14. The
lower courts, as well as, the Supreme Court, did not address the Fourteenth
Amendment aspect of Edge's challenge. Edge Broadcasting, 113 S. Ct. at 2696-2703.
36. Edge Broadcasting, 732 F. Supp. at 635. The district court denied motions
to dismiss and motions for summaryjudgment filed on behalf of the United States,
and after facts were agreed upon, counsel presented their written and oral argu-
ments. Id. The court determined that the federal statutes did not advance the
nonlottery states' interests to justify infringement on commercial speech as a
whole. Id. at 641.
37. Edge Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 5 F.3d 59 (4th Cir. 1992), rev'Id,
113 S. Ct. 2696 (1993).
38. Id. at 63. The Fourth Circuit held that: "(1) government had substantial
federal interest in permitting nonlottery states to discourage gambling, but (2)
federal regulatory scheme did not sufficiently advance government's federalism
interest to justify infringement of First Amendment protection for commercial
speech." Id. at 59-63. Judge Widener, in dissent, asserted Congress' "undoubted
right to enact the legislation which it did." Id. at 63 (Widener, J., dissenting).
"The fact that the legislation does not uniformly succeed in all instances is no
reason to hold it unconstitutional." Id. (Widener, J., dissenting).
39. United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 113 S. Ct. 2696 (1993).
40. Id. at 2708. The Cntral Hudson four-part analysis was utilized in determin-
ing the constitutionality of the applicable federal statutes. Id. at 2702-06. For an
explanation of Central Hudson analysis, see infra notes 94-98 and accompanying
text.
41. Edge Broadcasting, 113 S. Ct. at 2696.
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A. The Lottery
1. The National Perspective
Contemporary lotteries are seen as great sources of revenue.
Historically, however, lotteries have had a vast number of functions
and have been used in a variety of circumstances, from the election
of public officials, to the drafting of soldiers for combat.42 Lotter-
ies, as a form of entertainment, have not always been accepted as a
revenue raiser.43
On this continent, lotteries were an early part of the American
colonies. 44 In fact, the English authorized the holding of lotteries
to support the Virginia Company's Jamestown Settlement in 1612. 45
During early colonial times, Americans did not have an organized
lottery system because of the challenging nature of their existence;
they had neither the money nor the leisure time to gamble. 46
Colonial and eighteenth-century lotteries did exist, however, at
rudimentary levels and Americans "wove more simpler and more
frequent schemes into the fabric of daily business and local govern-
ment."47 In the colonial era, their use was primarily to finance pub-
lic projects.4S
42. NATIONAL INSTrrUTE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CmiMINALJUsTIcE, THE DE-
VELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF GAMBLING, 656 (1977).
43. Marvin v. Trout, 199 U.S. 212, 224 (1905). "For a great many years [the
lottery] has been very generally in this country regarded as a vice, to be prevented
and suppressed in the interest of the public morals and the public welfare." Id.
44. CLOTFELTER & COOK, supra note 1, at 34-35.
45. JOHN M. FINDLAY, PEOPLE OF CHANCE 12 (1986). Due to the dire situation
of the early settlers atJamestown, the lotteries sponsored by the Virginia Company
in England provided "the real and substantial food, by which Virginia [was] nour-
ished, referring to the men and provisions that had been shipped... with funds
raised through lotteries." Id. at 14. See also JOHN S. EZELL, FORTUNE'S MERRY
WHEEL 4 (1960) (discussing role of lottery in colonies).
46. FINDLAY, supra note 45, it 29. But cf DAVID JOHNSTON, TEMPLES OF
CHANCE 24 (1992) (as American settlements spread, so did opportunities for gam-
bling); EzELL, supra note 45, at 12 (American lottery transplanted itself into colo-
nies because of European lottery customs, economic pressures and lack of moral
opposition to practice).
47. FINDLAY, supra note 45, at 32. The American lotteries, born of English
parents, developed as simpler entities than their European counterparts. Id. Fol-
lowing the further settlement of the colonies, the lotteries evolved from separate
individual efforts, to the cumulative effects of many. EZELL, supra note 45, at 12-13.
48. FINDLAY, supra note 45, at 31-32. Colonists in early America used lotteries
to finance public, as well as, private business. Id. at 30. Harvard, Yale, Princeton
and King's College all used lottery proceeds to pay for university buildings. JOHN-
STON, supra note 46, at 24. Lottery monies were also earmarked to public infra-
structure development such as paving roads, constructing bridges, buildings and
wharves, although the line between public and private was traditionally blurred.
CLOTFELTER & COOK, supra note 1, at 34.
[Vol. II: p. 127
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Increasing complaints of fraud and disorganization in these
smaller entities led to the regulation of lotteries in many of the col-
onies.49 In 1777, the Continental Congress created the "United
States Lottery," a device used to raise one and a half million dollars
to fund the war with Britain.50
In the nineteenth century, the scale and organization of lotter-
ies drastically changed. 51 Private enterprise entered the scene on a
grand scale as dealers, manufacturers and sponsors of lotteries.52
Subsequently, there were frequent instances of fraud and dishon-
esty.53 Long time lottery opponents began to use these examples as
clear support of the uselessness and evil nature of the lottery.54
The culmination of anti-lottery groups' activity and the change
in American sentiment was evidenced by the enactment of the Anti-
Lottery Act of 1890 in which Congress banned all lottery materials
from the mails. 55 Lottery activity was later excluded by forbidding
the transportation of lottery materials in interstate or foreign com-
merce through congressional exercise of the Commerce Clause in
49. FINDLAY, supra note 45, at 32.
50. Id. at 33. The United States Lottery advertisements read: "It is not
doubted but every real friend of his country will most cheerfully become an adven-
turer, and that the sale of tickets will be very rapid, especially as even the unsuc-
cessful adventurer will have the pleasing reflection of having contributed a degree
to the great and glorious American cause." Id. The lottery received good response
at first, but ticket sales dwindled. Id. Prizes awarded to winners decreased in value:
"[w]inners received promissory notes due in five years at 4 percent interest per
annum, but with drastic inflation the value of such prizes declined precipitously.
The interest rate on notes awarded to later winners was raised to 6 percent, but
that hardly sufficed to attract new adventurers." Id. at 34.
51. Id. at 40.
52. CLOTFELTER & COOK, supra note 1, at 36.
53. FINDLAY, supra note 45, at 41; CLOTFELTER & CooK, supra note 1, at 37.
54. Ronald J. Rychlack, Lotteries, Revenues, and Social Costs: A Historical Exami-
nation of State Sponsored Gambling, 34 B.C. L. Ruv. 11, 37-38 (1992). The spirit of
reform against the lottery was pervasive, but there was a brief revival of the lottery
system in the 1860's, particularly in the southern and western states, due to a need
for revenue for government projects. Id. Louisiana had the most notorious of the
post-civil war lotteries. Id. at 40. Called "The Serpent," it was run by a New York
based gambling company and its estimated annual profits were in excess of $13
million dollars. Id, at 40-41.
55. Act of Sept. 19, 1890, ch. 908, § 1, 26 Stat. 465 (current version at 18
U.S.C. § 1302 (1988)). The Act provides in pertinent part: "No letter, post-card, or
circular concerning any lottery, . . . or other similar enterprise ... shall be carried
in the mail or delivered by any postmaster or letter carrier." Id. The Anti-Lottery
Act of 1890 was preceded by acts in 1868 and in 1876 which were designed to limit
state lotteries. See Act ofJuly 27, 1868, ch. 246, 15 Stat. 194 (unlawful to mail state
lottery information); Act of July 12, 1876, ch. 186, § 2, 19 Stat. 90 (banning mail-
ings of state sponsored or unauthorized lotteries). See Homer v. United States, 147
U.S. 449 (1893) (providing definitions for term "lottery" and affirming conviction
for mailing lottery materials).
9
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1895.56 Champion v. Ames,57 known as "The Lottery case," affirmed
congressional use of the Commerce Clause for regulation of lotter-
ies. 58 In Champion, a man was arrested and indicted for violation of
the Federal Lottery Act, which prohibited the mailing, importation,
or interstate transit of lottery tickets.59 The issue before the Court
was whether this Act was an unconstitutional infringement by the
federal government over areas that had been controlled by state
authority.60 The Champion Court established that the exercise of
the Commerce Clause did not infringe unconstitutionally upon
powers conferred to the states.61 While the exercise of federal pow-
ers helped foster anti-lottery efforts in the late nineteenth century,
such power did not keep states from establishing their own state-
sponsored lottery programs sixty years later.62
2. The State Perspective
In response to bleak fiscal conditions, many states resorted to
using lotteries as revenue generators.63 Despite numerous methods
of producing revenue, states nonetheless experienced continued
difficulty meeting the increased demands on state and municipal
56. Act of Mar. 2, 1895, ch. 191, § 1, 28 Stat. 963 (current version at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1301 (1988)). Id. The Act suppressed lottery traffic through national and inter-
state commerce and the postal service. Id.
The Commerce Clause provides in pertinent part: "[T]he Congress shall have
Power ... To regulate Commerce with foreign nations, and among the several
states, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
57. 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
58. "For three-quarters of a century after the elimination of the Louisiana
lottery [by the Act of 1895] by the federal government, no state sponsored lotteries
existed in the United States." DAVID WEINSTEIN & LnIAN DEITCH, THE IMPACT OF
LEGALIZED GAMBLING 14 (1974). The Court in Champion stated that,
if, in order to suppress lotteries carried on through interstate commerce,
Congress may exclude lottery tickets from such commerce, that principle
leads necessarily to the conclusion that Congress may arbitrarily exclude
from commerce among the States any article, commodity or thing... no
matter with what motive .... It will be time enough to consider the
constitutionality of such legislation when we must do so.
Champion, 188 U.S. at 362.
59. Champion, 188 U.S. at 322-23. In Champion, the accused was under indict-
ment in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois for a
conspiracy under the Lottery Act. Id. at 322.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 357. The magnitude of the Court's decision is evidenced in part by
the fact that the Court heard oral arguments three times before issuing its deci-
sion. Id. at 357-58.
62. G. Robert Blakely & Harold A. Kurland, The Development of the Federal Law
of Gambling, 34 B.C. L. REV. 11, 20 (1978).
63. ALAN J. KARcHER, LoTTERms 21 (1989).
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funds.64 For example, in 1963, New Hampshire desperately needed
another source of revenue for its flagging school system.65 New
Hampshire's Governor asserted that the duty of the state's political
representatives was to initiate lottery programs such as the New
Hampshire "Sweepstakes" to alleviate the economic burden on the
population.66
Unfortunately, New Hampshire's experiment with the revival
of the lottery was not as fruitful as expected; the economic goal of
the program was not fully realized.67 New Hampshire's state-spon-
sored lottery did not produce an immediate explosion of lotteries
nationwide.68 Later, however, the infusion of modern technology
into lottery systems 69 helped to tailor the lottery to the needs and
wants of the public and created instant success for states such as
NewJersey. 70 By 1975, ten other statesjoined the lottery movement
64. CLOTFELTER & COOK, supra note 1, at 140. Lotteries are viewed as a way to
forestall tax increases. The lottery is seen as a "painless tax," even though
lawmakers plainly state that there are more efficient and productive ways of gener-
ating funding for state needs. Id.; see also NAT'L INST. OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND
CRIMINAL JUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW OF GAM-
BUNG: 1776-1976, 680-84 (1977) [hereinafter DEVELOPMENTS] (discussing notion
of "painless tax").
65. WEINSTEIN & DEITCH, supra note 58, at 15. "New Hampshire's local gov-
ernments and schools were almost totally dependant on property taxes, which had
been pushed to an oppressive level." Id. Often the strongest argument in favor of
implementing lottery programs is the effect they will have on public education, but
lottery programs, critics argue, are not the panacea for public education that some
states would have its citizens believe. Robert Gnaizda, Commission Bets Its Advertising
Claims Aren't Deceiving, Los ANGELES DAILYJ., Apr. 20, 1987, at 4.
66. WEINSTEIN & DErrCH, supra note 58, at 15.
67. MARY 0. BORG ET AL., THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF STATE LOTIRuIES
3 (1991). "Although the lottery began with great fanfare, the revenue expectations
were never met, and more importandy, after the first year, revenues actually de-
clined for several years before again inching upward." Id. See DEVELOPMENTS, supra
note 64, at 700-02 (detailing New Hampshire's lottery experience).
68. BORG, supra note 67, at 3. New York became the second lottery state in
1968, but once again problems plagued the system, essentially, the lottery was not
the panacea the lawmakers had hoped that it would be. Id. See also CLOTFELTER &
COOK, supra note 1, at 3. See, e.g., New York State Broadcasters Ass'n v. United
States, 414 F.2d 990, 991 (2d Cir. 1969) (providing background information on
New York lottery), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1061 (1970).
69. CLOTFELTER & COOK, supra note 1, at 53. In an effort to reduce opportu-
nities for fraud and forgery and expedite sales, New York computerized its entire
system. DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 64, at 703. See WEINSTEIN & DEITCH, supra note
58, at 16.
70. DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 64, at 703. In the first six months, New Jersey
netted $30 million from its lottery. BORG, supra note 67, at 3. NewJersey's innova-
tions included "low priced tickets, instant winners, and heavy promotion" all of
which were easily facilitated through modern technological advances. Id. New
Hampshire and New York followed NewJersey's example and other states became
interested in following New Jersey's lead. WEINSTEIN & DErrCH, supra note 58, at
16.
11
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and Congress, acknowledging the need to aid states in their legal
sponsorship of state run lotteries, amended the standing statutory
provisions by enacting 18 U.S.C. § 1307, exempting states from the
ban on advertising for intrastate lottery programs. 71 By 1988, sixty-
six percent of the country's population lived in lottery states72 and
by the close of 1994, thirty-seven states had lotteries.73 One com-
mentator noted, "[i]t has been projected that nearly every state will
have a lottery by the end of this decade." 74
A great handicap to state lotteries throughout much of this
century has been the federal statutory prohibition contained in 18
U.S.C. § 1304 against radio advertisements of lottery materials. 75 In
1976, Congress realized the need to alter existing law to make room
for the wave of state lotteries and enacted 18 U.S.C. § 1307, exempt-
ing state-authorized lotteries from the prohibitions of section
1304.76
B. Commercial Speech
The First Amendment prohibits governmental interference
with speech.77 However, the Supreme Court has recognized a
" 'common sense' distinction between speech proposing a commer-
cial transaction, which occurs in an area traditionally subject to gov-
ernment regulation, and other varieties of speech."78
71. For the full text of § 1307, see supra note 14. In adopting § 1307, the
House Judiciary Committee recognized that this provision was a flawed resolution,
but nonetheless, Congress decided to promote "protection of the policies and the
interests of the States which do not provide for such lotteries." H.R. REP. No. 1517,
93rd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.CA.N. 7007, 7011.
72. CLOTFELTER & CooK, supra note 1, at 144. See Rychlack, supra note 54, at
45 (noting lotteries are popular forms of gambling in 33 states and District of
Columbia). See generally DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 64, at 704-34.
73. Pamela Greenberg, State Lottery Count (Nov. 15, 1994) (unpublished
data, calculations on file with NAT'L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATORS).
74. Rychlack, supra note 54, at 45-46.
75. 18 U.S.C. § 1304 (1988) (amended Nov. 7, 1988) (amended to include tel-
evision advertising). For the relevant text of § 1304, see supra note 14.
76. 18 U.S.C. § 1307 (1988). For the relevant text of§ 1307, see supra note 14
and accompanying text.
77. U.S. CONST. amend. I. See also Mark D. Lurie, Issue Advertising Commercial
Expressions, and Freedom of Speech: A Proposed Framework for First Amendment Adjudica-
tion, 28 B.C. L. Rv. 981, 983 (1987) (explaining importance of protecting First
Amendment rights).
78. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1978). The
Supreme Court's use of the term "commercial speech" is imprecise. McGowan,
supra note 5, at 360 n.4. "[S]peech proposing a commercial transaction" is the
generally accepted definition. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 562 (1980).
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In its first analysis of commercial speech, the Supreme Court
refused to extend First Amendment protection, primarily because
of the advertiser's interest in financial gain. 79 In 1951, the Court
held in Breard v. City of Alexandria,80 that an ordinance banning the
selling of products door-to-door was valid and did not violate the
salesman's First Amendment rights.81 The Court reasoned that
commercial speech was distinguishable from otherwise protected
speech because speech for a commercial purpose had less constitu-
tional "weight."8 2
The Court began reexamining the First Amendment protec-
tion afforded commercial speech in the early 1970's and made a
conscious effort to further extend such protection.8 3 In Bigelow v.
Virginia,84 the Court invalidated a state statute that outlawed adver-
tising of abortion services.8 5 The Court determined that "[a state]
79. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942). In Valentine, the Court ad-
dressed First Amendment protection of a handbill advertising a submarine tourist
attraction. Id. at 54. Because the papers were primarily commercial, the Court
asserted that it was "clear the Constitution imposes no... restraint on government
as respects purely commercial advertising." Id.
80. 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
81. Id. at 645. The ordinance at issue in Breard prohibited "solicitors, ped-
dlers, hawkers, itinerant merchants or transient vendors of merchandise" from
soliciting private homes absent an invitation or a request by the owner(s) of the
residence. Id. at 624-25. The Court found that the regulation did not curtail the
salesman's First Amendment rights and had the legitimate purpose of regulating
an "obnoxious" type of solicitation. Id. at 644-45. For a further discussion of
Breard and its effect in the realm of privacy issues, see Ken Gormley, One Hundred
Years of Privacy, 1992 Wis. L. REv. 1335, 1377 (1992) (detailing clash between un-
daunting solicitor and unwilling homeowner). For a discussion of Breard in the
commercial speech context, see Brent P. Copenhaver, Comment, Zauderer v. Of-
fice of Disciplinary Counsel: Refining the Regulation of Attorney Advertising, 88 W. VA.
L. REv. 265, 270 (1985) (discussing Breard as part of commercial speech exception
to First Amendment protections).
82. Breard, 341 U.S. at 644-45 (1951). See Howell A. Burkhalter, Advertorial
Advertising and the Commercial Speech Doctrine, 25 WAKE FoREsT L. REv. 861, 863
(1990) (commercial speech has inherent hardiness exempting it from typical First
Amendment protections). The Court's decision in Breard has come under harsh
scrutiny. "[S] ince the decision in Breard, however, the Court has never denied pro-
tection on the ground that the speech in issue was 'commercial speech.' That sim-
plistic approach .... had come under criticism or was regarded as of doubtful
validity by Members of the Court." Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citi-
zens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 759 (1976).
83. Joel M. Gora, Back From the Brink: Part I, 10 TouRo L. REv. 459, 461
(1994). In 1975 and 1976, the Court extended First Amendment protections to
commercial advertising. Id.
84. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
85. Id. at 829. A Virginia based newspaper published a New York company's
advertisement announcing that the company would arrange economical solutions
for women with unwanted pregnancies in New York where abortions were legal
and there was no residency requirement. Id. at 811-12. Bigelow, the managing
editor of the newspaper, was convicted of a misdemeanor for his violation of a state
13
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may not, under the guise of exercising internal police powers, bar a
citizen of another state from disseminating information about an
activity that is legal in that state."86
In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council87 the Court held, as presaged by Bigelow, that commercial
speech must get some First Amendment protection.88 Virginia Phar-
macy represented the first time that the Supreme Court acknowl-
edged the consumer's right to an uninhibited flow of commercial
information and that government generated ignorance was to be
avoided. 89 Virginia Pharmacy did not establish the full extent of First
Amendment protection of commercial speech, but rather served as
a landmark case, providing the possibility of broader protection in
subsequent cases.90
In 1980, the Court clarified its Virginia Pharmacy holding and
developed a four-part test that has been used as the benchmark for
determining the constitutionality of any restriction on commercial
speech. 91 This four-part test, the Central Hudson test, was estab-
statute barring the sale or printing of any publication supporting abortions. Id. at
812.
86. Id. at 824-25. The majority opinion, authored byJustice Blackmun, stated
that the lower courts erred in assuming that advertising was not entitled to First
Amendment protection. Id. at 825. The opinion noted that speech concerning a
commercial transaction is not automatically deprived of constitutional protection.
Id. at 818-19.
87. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
88. Id. at 762. Virginia Pharmacy extended First Amendment protection to
commercial speech. Id. Prior to Virginia Pharmacy, some commercial speech issues
had been addressed in Bigelow. Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 809. The Bigelow opinion advo-
cated a balancing approach weighing the interests of the First Amendment rights
against the police power advanced by the interest. Id. at 821. The Bigelow holding
was seen as more narrowly tailored to prohibit states from restraining advertise-
ments about activities which were constitutionally guaranteed. JOHN E. NOwAK &
RONALi) D. ROTUNDA, CONSTrTUONAL LAW § 16.31, at 1019 (4th ed. 1991). In-
deed, Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court, limited his holding stating that it
was unnecessary for the Court to decide the First Amendment issue in the case.
Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 825. SeeJonathan Weinberg, Note, Constitutional Protection of
Commercial Speech, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 720 (1982) (arguing strict scrutiny protection
for commercial speech).
89. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 764, 766. The Court stated, "[als to the
particular consumer's interest in the free flow of commercial information, that
interest may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his interest in the day's most
urgent political debate." Id. at 763.
90. In footnote 24 of the Virginia Pharmacy decision, the Court laid the
groundwork for the subsequent shaping of the commercial speech doctrine by
making two arguments: (1) that false commercial speech has no value and deserves
no constitutional protection and (2) the existence of such speech should not ex-
clude the mass of valuable correct advertising from getting the constitutional pro-
tection it was due. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 771-72 n.24.
91. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557
(1980). For a listing of the four prongs of the Central Hudson test for commercial
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lished in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commis-
sion.92 Under consideration was the issue of whether a regulation
which proscribed an electric utility from advertising to promote the
use of electricity violated the Constitution.93 Based on the four-part
test articulated, the Court determined that the ban violated the
Constitution. 94
The Central Hudson test begins with a determination of whether
the speech is truthful and not misleading. 95 The court must then
evaluate whether the asserted governmental interest served by the
restriction on commercial speech is substantial. 96 If both questions
are answered affirmatively, the test's third prong requires the court
to assess whether the regulation directly advances the asserted gov-
ernmental interest.97 Finally, the test requires that the regulation
not be more extensive than is necessary to serve the applicable state
interest.98 The Central Hudson test remains the only definitive test
used in evaluating the constitutionality of restrictions imposed on
commercial speech.99
speech, see supra note 10. The creation of a four-part test "was significant both for
the nature of the test itself and because the Court's creation of the test implicitly
admitted that states could regulate even some truthful commercial speech." Mc-
Gowan, supra note 5, at 372.
92. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
93. Id. at 558-61. Central Hudson involved the Court's consideration of a New
York Public Service Commission rule banning electrical utilities, subject to its juris-
diction, from running advertisements that encouraged or advocated electricity
consumption. Id. at 559. The Commission's reasoning for promulgating the rule
was in keeping with the national trend toward conservation of energy. Id. at 559-
60. Excessive advertising of energy sources, the Commission feared, would send
mixed signals to the public about energy conservation. Id. at 560.
94. Id. at 561-72. After applying the test, the Court held the Commission's
order unconstitutional on two grounds. Id. at 561. First, the order prohibited all
advertising, including promotion of products and services that use energy as or
more efficiently than alternatives. Id. Second, the Commission failed to demon-
strate that a more limited restriction would not adequately further the interest in
energy conservation. Id. The restriction on the promotion of electricity was,
therefore, unconstitutional under the First Amendment. Id.
95. Id. at 562-64. Therefore, the government has the ability to quash mislead-
ing or deceptive advertising and commercial speech related to illegal activity. Id.
at 563 (citing Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar
Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978)).
96. Id. at 564.
97. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 564.
98. Id. at 565.
99. David P. KaIm, Note, First Amendment-Free Speech-A Prophylactic Ban on Per-
sonal Solicitation by Certified Public Accountants in a Business Context Vwlates the First
Amendment's Guarantee of Freedom ofSpeech-Edenfield v. Fane, 113 S. Ct. 1792 (1993),
24 SETON HALL L. REv. 1579, 1597 (1994) (advocating that Central Hudson provides
guidelines for commercial speech cases); Jerry Elliot, Comment, The First Amend-
ment, In Re RM.J., and State Regulation of Direct Mail Lawyer Advertising, 34 BAYLOR L.
REv. 411, 418 (1982) (characterizing four-part Central Hudson analysis as "uniform
15
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In 1986, the Court applied the Central Hudson analysis in
Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico.'00 In
Posadas, the Court approved a statutory ban on casino gambling ad-
vertising, stating that the ban was not facially unconstitutional or
vague.' 01 The Court stated that "the greater power to completely
ban casino gambling necessarily includes the lesser power to ban
advertising of casino gambling."102 The Posadas dissenters criticized
the majority's reliance on Central Hudson because of the vague na-
ture of the Central Hudson test and they advocated a more narrowly
defined procedure for determining what prohibition on speech is
permitted.,0 3
The focus of the Posadas dissent, the generalized and broad
nature of the Central Hudson test, surfaced in the majority opinion
in Board of Trustees of the State University of New York v. Fox.10 4 At issue
in Fox was whether a state university could regulate a product dem-
onstration in campus dormitory rooms when the presentation was
requested by the residing student. 05 After university officials ap-
and definitive"). Commentators have criticized the Central Hudson "definitive test"
stating, "[the test] enshrined as it was for... years into the fundamental law of the
land, is a mechanism for the generation of random results." Christopher C. Faille,
Spinning the Roulette WheeL" Commercial Speech and Philosophical Cogency, 41 FED. B.
NEWS & J., Jan. 1994, at 60. It has been noted:
It is child's play for any professional advocate to produce a pair of argu-
ments of equal strength around [the] fourth [prong] given any particular
fact pattern. If the advocate needs to argue that there was a least restric-
tive alternative, he/she will describe the substantial state interest in gen-
eral terms, and advance a variety of other means that might have been
employed to achieve that general good. If the advocate needs to argue
that there was no less restrictive alternative available, he/she will list par-
ticular effects the system in place does achieve, which other systems, de-
scribed with equal particularity, would not or at least might not achieve.
Id.
100. 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
101. Id. at 329. The statute at issue concerned a Puerto Rico gambling restric-
tion banning the advertisement of gambling to local residents, but permitting ad-
vertisements aimed at American tourists. Id. at 330.
102. Id. at 345-46. The Court stated that "it is precisely because the govern-
ment could have enacted a wholesale prohibition of the underlying conduct that it
is permissible for the government to take the less intrusive step of allowing the
conduct but reducing the demand through restrictions on advertising." Id. at 346.
103. Id. at 350-51 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissent criticized the major-
ity's application as not narrowly tailored thereby ensuring arbitrary and random
results. Id. at 351 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Additionally, the dissent stated that
when "the government seeks to suppress the dissemination of nonmisleading com-
mercial speech relating to legal activities .... such regulations should be subject to
strict judicial scrutiny." Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
104. 492 U.S. 469 (1989).
105. Id. at 488-89. The State University of New York instituted regulations
banning the operation of any commercial enterprise for any purpose, other than
those specifically exempted in the regulation. Id. at 471-72. A company selling
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peared, demanding the conclusion of the meeting, the sponsoring
students filed sUit. 10 6 Fox asserted the availability of "less intrusive"
or "less restrictive" means by which the university administration
could have exercised its authority to maintain order on campus. 10 7
Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, clarified the fourth prong of
the Central Hudson test stating that "the decisions require only a rea-
sonable 'fit' between the government's ends and the means chosen
to accomplish those ends."'08 In the aforementioned decisions, the
Court "has emphasized that 'commercial speech [enjoys] a limited
measure of protection, commensurate with its subordinate position
in the scale of First Amendment values,' and is subject to 'modes of
regulation that might be impermissible in the realm of noncom-
mercial expression.' "109
Several recent decisions have created conflicting notions as to
the direction of the commercial speech doctrine. 110 In 1993, the
Court decided City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc.,"' which
invalidated a city ordinance that banned commercial newsracks
from the city streets. 112 In Discovery Network, the Court noted the
absence of a "reasonable fit" between the newsrack ban and the
housewares and sponsoring "tup perware parties," tried to arrange a tupperware
party in a dorm room. Id. at 472. After campus security intervened, the tup-
perware representative was arrested and taken off campus. Id.
106. Id. at 472. The students alleged that their First Amendment rights were
being infringed upon by the University's prohibition on their hosting and attend-
ing these product demonstrations (tupperware parties) and that they were pre-
vented from their discussions with other commercial invitees as a further violation
of their constitutional rights. Id.
107. Id. at 477.
108. Id. at 480. Justice Scalia further stated that the fit "represents not neces-
sarily the single best disposition but one whose scope is in proportion to the inter-
est served, that employs not necessarily the least restrictive means but, as we have
put it in other contexts ... a means narrowly tailored to achieve the desired objec-
tive. Within those bounds we leave it to governmental decisionmakers to judge
what manner of regulation may be best employed." Id. (citations omitted).
109. City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 1505, 1521-22
(1993) (quoting Fox, 492 U.S. at 477 (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436
U.S. 447, 456 (1978))).
110. Erwin Chemerinsky, Commercial Speech: What Degree of Protection?, TRLAL,
Aug. 1993, at 66 (Court vacillated over commercial speech doctrine since allowing
it protection); see Felix H. Kent, Re-Affirmation of First Amendment in Commercial
Speech, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 16, 1993, at 3 (Court's consistency in commercial speech area
changes with Court makeup).
111. 113 S. Ct. 1505 (1993).
112. Id. at 1516. The city ordinance was used to ban commercial, but not
non-commercial newsracks to further safety and aesthetics. Id. at 1508-09. See also
Court: Commercial Speech Deserves Protection, NAT'L LJ., Apr. 5, 1993, for a further
discussion of Discovery Network.
17
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city's legitimate interest in safety and aesthetics.113 The Court also
staunchly defended the constitutional protections of commercial
speech when Cincinnati tried to assert that "the 'low value' of com-
mercial speech [was] a sufficient justification for its selective and
categorical ban." 1 4 The Court declared that they were unwilling to
accept Cincinnati's "bare assertion that the 'low value' of commer-
cial speech [wa]s a sufficient justification for its selective and cate-
gorical ban on newsracks dispensing 'commercial handbills.' "115
The dissent in Discovery Network argued that the Court's previous
decisions only afforded commercial speech limited protection. The
dissent, therefore, asserted that the majority's opinion was contrary
to precedent and undermined a uniform application of the com-
mercial speech doctrine. 116
In Edenfield v. Fane,117 a Certified Public Accountant (CPA)
sued the Florida Board of Accountancy, asserting the unconstitu-
tionality of a rule requiring, in part, that a CPA "shall not by any
direct, in-person, uninvited solicitation solicit an engagement to
perform public accounting services ... ."118 In striking down the
Florida rule, the Court stated:
The type of personal solicitation prohibited here is clearly
commercial expression to which First Amendment protec-
113. Discovery Network, 113 S. Ct. at 1510. The Court stressed that Cincinnati
failed to offer an adequate justification for treating commercial newspapers differ-
ently from other printed material. Id. at 1516.
114. Id. at 1516.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1521 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The Chief Justice, joined by
Justices White and Thomas, emphasized the need to adhere to a uniform interpre-
tation of the commercial speech doctrine and that the doctrine's application
should yield limited constitutional protections. Id. at 1521-22. (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting). The Discovery Network dissent stated that the Court's jurisprudence has
emphasized a subordinate position for commercial speech in the First Amendment
realm along with limited protection for such speech. Id. at 1522 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting) (citing Board of Trustees of the State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469,
477 (1989)). The durability of commercial speech, according to Rehnquist, justi-
fies treating it differently. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). The dissent asserted
further that "[c]ommercial speech is also 'less central to the interests of the First
Amendment' than other types of speech, such as political expression." Id. (Rehn-
quist, C.J., dissenting) (citing Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980) (quoting Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss
Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 758 n.5 (1985) (Powell, J., opinion))). Further, the
dissent characterized the majority's opinion as "offer[ing] little in the way of prece-
dent [to] support its new rule," in other words, the majority did not follow applica-
ble precedent and rather cited cases that did not involve the regulation of
commercial speech in support of its holding. Id. at 1524 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting).
117. 113 S. Ct. 1792 (1993).
118. Id. at 1796 (quoting FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. v. 21A-24(3) (1992)).
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tions apply .... In denying CPA's and their clients the consid-
erable advantages of solicitation in the commercial context,
Forida's law threatens societal interests in broad access to com-
plete and accurate commercial information that the First Amend-
ment is designed to safeguard.
However, commercial speech is "linked inextricably"
with the commercial arrangement that it proposes, so that
the State's interest in regulating the underlying transac-
tion may give it a concomitant interest in the expression
itself. Thus, Florida's rule need only be tailored in a rea-
sonable manner to serve a substantial state interest. 1 9
Discovery Network and Edenfield both seemed to suggest that the
Court was moving toward a more commercial-friendly view of the
notion that commercial speech is " 'less central to the interests of
the First Amendment' than other types of speech, such as political
expression." 20
IV. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
A. The Majority Opinion
Justice White, writing for the majority in Edge Broadcasting,21
reviewed the constitutionality of two federal statutes that collectively
prohibit the broadcast of lottery promotions in nonlottery states. 122
Using the Central Hudson four factors test, the district court con-
cluded that the statutes, as applied to Edge, did not directly ad-
119. Id. at 1798 (emphasis added).
120. Id. at 1522 (quoting Dun & Bradstreet, 472 U.S. at 758 n.5; see also, Kent,
supra note 110, at 3 (current Supreme Court makeup supports commercial speech
protection).
121. Justice White wrote the majority opinion of the Court as to Parts I, II,
and IV in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy,
Souter and Thomas joined. The opinion of the Court with respect to Parts III-A
and III-B was joined by ChiefJustice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia and
Thomas. Part III-C of the Court's opinion was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
Justices Kennedy, Souter and Thomas. Part III-D of the opinion was joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas. Justice Souter filed an
opinion concurring in part, in which Justice Kennedy joined. Justice Stevens filed
a dissenting opinion in which Justice Blackmun joined.
122. Edge Broadcasting, 113 S. Ct. at 2700. For the full text of the federal stat-
utes at issue, see supra note 14.
19
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vance the asserted governmental interest.1 23 The court of appeals
affirmed on the same grounds. 124
The Supreme Court began its analysis with the history of the
lottery in both the judicial and the legislative branches of govern-
ment.125 The Court noted that significant changes occurred when
broadcasting entered into the lottery equation, resulting in the
adoption of 18 U.S.C. § 1304.126 After lotteries turned into virtual
state "public policy,"1 27 Congress adopted 18 U.S.C. § 1307, an "ex-
ception [that] was enacted 'to accommodate the operation of le-
gally authorized State-run lotteries consistent with continued
Federal protection to the policies of non-lottery states.' "128 The
Court also took note of Virginia's current status as a lottery state
and North Carolina's nonlottery state status.129
The Court dismissed the government's assertion that the Cen-
tral Hudson analysis should not be used because of the lottery's ac-
knowledged status as a "vice."130 The government wanted the
Court to follow Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Pu-
erto Rico,'31 and conclude that "the greater power to prohibit gam-
bling necessarily includes the lesser power to ban its adver-
tisement."13 2
123. Edge Broadcasting, 113 S. Ct. at 2702. The district court held that the
federal statutes which were enacted to further federalism by permitting nonlottery
states to discourage gambling, do not advance the goals of the nonlottery states
sufficiently to justify the infringement on commercial speech; the statutes could
not be given a narrowing construction. Edge Broadcasting Co. v. United States,
732 F. Supp. 633 (E.D. Va. 1990), aff'd, 5 F.3d 59 (4th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 113 S. Ct.
2696 (1993).
124. Id. at 2702-03. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-
cuit held that: "(1) government had substantial federalism interest in permitting
nonlottery states to discourage gambling, but (2) federal regulatory scheme did
not sufficiently advance government's federalism interest to justify infringement of
First Amendment protection for commercial speech." Edge Broadcasting Co. v.
United States, 5 F.3d 59 (4th Cir. 1992), revod, 113 S. Ct. 2696 (1993).
125. Id. at 2700-02.
126. Id. at 2701 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1304 (1988)). For the text of the code, see
supra note 14.
127. For a detailed discussion of the state movement to sponsor lotteries, see
supra notes 54-75 and accompanying text.
128. Edge Broadcasting, 113 S. Ct. at 2701 (quoting H. REP. No. 1517, 93rd
Cong. 5 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.CAN. at 7007).
129. Id. at 2701-02.
130. Id. at 2703. The Court noted that the Fourth Circuit did not address the
issue of the lottery's position as a "vice" and the idea that the greater power to
prohibit gambling necessarily includes the lesser power to ban its advertisement.
Id. Therefore, the Court also did not address the issue. Id.
131. 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
132. Edge Broadcasting, 113 S. Ct. at 2703. See also Posadas, 478 U.S. at 344
(Puerto Rican legislature has power to ban casino gambling, thus, greater power to
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Rather, the Court, like the courts below, initiated the four
prong analysis under Central Hudson.'33 Under the first factor in
Central Hudson, the Court assumed that Edge would air nonmislead-
ing advertisements about the Virginia lottery, a legal activity.134 Ad-
hering to the lower courts' reasoning in applying the second Central
Hudson factor, the Court affirmed the substantial governmental in-
terest in supporting nonlottery states' policies, as well as not inter-
fering with states that sponsor lotteries.135 The Court disagreed
with the lower courts' holdings regarding the third and fourth Cen-
tral Hudson factors. 13 6
The Court cautioned that the third step of the analysis cannot
be simply limited to questioning how the governmental interest is
advanced as applied to a single person or entity. 137 Quoting its
holding in Posadas, the Court narrowed the third and fourth steps
of Central Hudson stating, "[t] he last two steps of the Central Hudson
analysis basically involve a consideration of the 'fit' between the leg-
islature's ends and the means chosen to accomplish those ends."138
This requirement for narrow tailoring is met "'so long as the ...
regulation promotes a substantial governmental interest that would
be achieved less effectively absent the regulation.' "139
In the Court's opinion, the constitutionality of the statutes had
to be measured by their general application to "all other radio and
television stations in North Carolina and countrywide" and not just
prohibit "vice" includes lesser power to proscribe advertisement). For a further
discussion of Posadas, see supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text.
133. Edge Broadcasting, 113 S. Ct. at 2703. For a discussion of all four factors in
the Central Hudson analysis, see supra notes 94-98 and accompanying text.
134. Edge Broadcasting, 113 S. Ct. at 2703. The lower courts also followed this
assumption. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 2702-03. The district court and the Fourth Circuit found that
under the third prong of the Central Hudson test, whether a substantial governmen-
tal interest was asserted and advanced by the regulation, the statutes failed to ad-
vance the governmental interest supporting them. Id. at 2702. They concluded
that because of the other types and quantities of media with lottery advertisements
that reach North Carolina residents, prohibiting Edge from broadcasting would
not "shield[ I North Carolina residents from lottery information." Id. at 2703-04.
The lower courts held that "this ineffective or remote measure to support North
Carolina's desire to discourage gambling cannot justify infringement upon com-
mercial free speech." Id. at 2704.
137. Id. at 2704.
138. Id. (quoting Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto
Rico, 478 U.S. 328, 341 (1986)).
139. Edge Broadcasting, 113 S. Ct. at 2705 (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism,
491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989) (quoting United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689
(1985))).
21
Schiller: The Lottery in United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co.: Vice or Vi
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1995
148 VI..ANovA SPORTS & ENT. LAW FORUM
to Edge's broadcast area.140 Thus, as the statutes are applied na-
tionwide, the Court ruled that they substantially further the govern-
ment interest in supporting those states that discourage lottery
participation as well as those states that sponsor lotteries.1 41 In sup-
port of this proposition, the Court noted the absence of any case it
had decided that held to the contrary. 42
Further, the Court mentioned that congressional intent be-
hind section 1304 was to "support the anti-gambling policy of a
state like North Carolina by forbidding stations in such a state from
airing lottery advertisements." 143 Therefore, because POWER 94
was based out of Moyuck, North Carolina, and licensed as a North
Carolina station, enforcing the statute would eliminate at least
some of the lottery advertising infused into the state.'"
The Court held that the examination of the statutes, as applied
to Edge Broadcasting, was a consideration appropriate to the fourth
prong of the Central Hudson test.145 Citing its decision in Board of
Trustees of the State University of New York v. Fox,146 as support, the
Court asserted that only a reasonable fit was necessary, not a perfect
one, between the restriction and the governmental interest in com-
mercial speech cases.147 The Court said that although ninety-two
percent of POWER 94's listeners are in Virginia, allowing the sta-
140. Id. at 2704.
141. Id. at 2705-06. The Edge Broadcasting Court rejected Edge Broadcasting
Co.'s assertion that Fane stood for an "as applied" standard of review by stating that
"[w]hile treating Fane's claim as an applied challenge to a broad category of com-
mercial solicitation, [the Court] did not suggest that Fane could challenge the
regulation on commercial speech as applied only to himself or his own acts of
solicitation." Id. at 2706. Fane also illustrates the general problem of accommodat-
ing both lottery and nonlottery states, notjust accommodating commercial speech
in relation to Edge Broadcasting's isolated example. Id. at 2706.
142. Id. at 2706 (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447
(1978)).
143. Id. at 2704.
Congress surely knew that stations in one state could often be heard in
another .... Congress plainly made the commonsense judgment that
each North Carolina station would have an audience in that State, even if
its signal reached elsewhere and that enforcing the statutory restriction
would insulate each station's listeners from lottery ads and hence advance
the governmental purpose of supporting North Carolina's laws against
gambling. Id.
144. Edge Broadcasting, 113 S. Ct. at 2706. For background on POWER 94, see
supra note 22 and accompanying text.
145. Id. at 2704-05. "[T] he fourth Central Hudson factor is . . . whether the
regulation is more extensive than necessary to serve the governmental interest." Id.
146. 492 U.S. 469 (1989).
147. Edge Broadcasting, 113 S. Ct. at 2705 (citing Board of Trustees of the State
Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989)). For a further discussion of Fox, see
supra notes 104-09 and accompanying text.
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non to broadcast lottery advertisements from North Carolina would
derogate the substantial federal interest in supporting North Caro-
lina laws that discourage public participation in lotteries. 148 The
Court, therefore, found that the restriction as applied to Edge was
reasonable, and the fit was no broader than was necessary to serve
the governmental interest. 149 The Court further stated that com-
mercial speech restrictions should not be judged by standards more
stringent then those applied to expressive conduct entitled to First
Amendment protection. 150
After validating the constitutionality of the statutes in their
general application, the Court noted that even if an "as applied"
standard was utilized, the statutes would still be upheld. 151 The
Court concluded that Edge's broadcasts would have neither an "in-
effective" or "remote" result in its broadcast of lottery advertise-
ments to North Carolina.1 52 Significant facts included that the
127,000 North Carolinians reached by Edge's signal also received
Virginia radio and television broadcasts as well as newspapers al-
ready carrying the lottery advertisements. 15 The Court found that
if Edge was allowed to advertise, then the airing time of lottery ad-
vertisements would increase from thirty-eight percent to forty-nine
percent, a fact of considerable significance to the Court.1 54
The Court also rejected the lower courts' finding that the fed-
eral statutes must "effectively shield" North Carolina residents from
lottery information to advance the purpose of the statutes.1 55 Re-
sponding to criticism that the statutes were not eradicating lottery
advertising from the airwaves of North Carolina, the Court re-
148. Id. at 2702-04.
149. Id. at 2705-07.
150. Id. at 2705. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), is the bench-
mark case that defined the standards for expressive conduct. JEROME A. BARRON &
C. THOMAS DIENES, CONSTrrUTIoNAL LAW IN A NUTSHELL 296 (1991). O'Brien in-
volved the prosecution of a draft card burner in the 1960's, in which the defendant
argued that his use of symbolic speech was a complete First Amendment defense
to his prosecution for draft card burning. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 369. In O'Brien, the
Court established that when speech and nonspeech are combined in conduct, an
incidental restriction of expression resulting from regulating the nonspeech ele-
ment could be justified only if certain requirements were fulfilled. Id. at 376.
These requirements include: (1) the regulation must further an important govern-
mental interest; (2) the government interest must be unrelated to the suppression
of free expression; and (3) the incidental restriction on alleged freedom must be
no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. Id. at 377.
151. Edge Broadcasting, 113 S. Ct. at 2707-08.
152. Id. at 2706.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 2707.
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sponded that there is no requirement for the government to "make
progress on every front before it can make progress on any
front."156 The Court reasoned:
If there is an immediate connection between advertising
and demand, and the federal regulation decreases adver-
tising, it stands to reason that the policy of decreasing
demand for gambling is correspondingly advanced. Ac-
cordingly, the Government may be said to advance its pur-
pose by substantially reducing lottery advertising, even
where it is not wholly eradicated.157
A plurality of the Court noted that Edge made the choice to
broadcast from a North Carolina city.158 Justices Rehnquist, Scalia,
Thomas and White rejected Edge's contention that Edge should be
allowed to air broadcasts of lottery advertisements because of the
"spillover" that extends into Virginia from its broadcasts. 159 By
granting the radio station's argument, the Court would "effectively
[be] extending the legal regime of Virginia inside North Caro-
lina."160 Furthermore, the plurality intimated that rendering the
statutes invalid as applied only to Edge would cause a tidal wave of
litigation and claims of other broadcasters that the statute was inva-
lid as applied to them and their individual circumstances. 16 1 In ad-
dition, the plurality expressed concern that Edge's approach has
"no logical stopping point once state boundaries are ignored," and
thought that claims of other broadcasters in North Carolina would
create so many exceptions as to render the State's lottery ban
worthless.' 62
B. The Dissent
Justice Stevens, writing for the dissent, opposed the majority's
construction of the "fit" between the statutes and the government's
interests as being reasonable.1 63 Justice Stevens believed that the
federal government's selective ban on advertising acts to manipu-
late public behavior through the suppression of truthful informa-
156. Edge Broadcasting, 113 S. Ct. at 2707.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 2708 (Rehnquist, CJ., ScaliaJ., ThomasJ.).
159. Id. (Rehnquist, CJ., ScaliaJ., Thomas, J.).
160. Id.
161. Edge Broadcasting, 113 S. Ct. at 2708.
162. Id.
163. Id. at 2708-09 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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tion regarding a neighboring state's policies.164 Justice Stevens
wrote that the real issue in Edge Broadcasting, as it was in Bigelow v.
Virginia,165 was "information protectionalism. . . [protectionalism
meaning,] one State's interference with its citizens' fundamental
constitutional right to [not] travel in a state of... government-
induced ignorance."1 66 In Justice Stevens' opinion, a government
imposed ban that is not justified by a truly substantial governmental
interest acts to exclude truthful information from the public and
manipulate the consumer choice of its citizenry. 167 Charging the
majority with not fully dissecting the case and using "barely a
whisper of analysis," Justice Stevens said there was no substantial
governmental interest in supporting nonlottery states' an-
tigambling policies. 168 Justice Stevens believed that the federal in-
terest in supporting North Carolina's policy of discouraging public
participation in lotteries does not justify suppressing commercial
speech. 169 Justice Stevens wrote that while the federal government
and the states may have an interest in promoting antigambling poli-
cies, this interest was undercut by the "sea [of] change in public
attitudes toward state-run lotteries that this country has witnessed in
recent years." 170 "[H]ostility to state-run lotteries is the exception
rather than the norm" and this fact, coupled with the national
trend toward acceptance of and institution of lotteries, does not
give the federal government "an overriding... interest in seeking
to discourage what virtually the entire country is embracing .... 1171
Justice Stevens cited numerous statistics in support of his posi-
tion.172 Because of an absence of a substantial governmental inter-
164. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens further asserted that the gov-
ernmental interest in this case was "entirely derivative." Id. at 2709 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). He felt that the government has no duty to restrict state-run lotteries.
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
165. 421 U.S. 809 (1975). For a full discussion of Bigelow, see supra notes 84-
88 and accompanying text.
166. Edge Broadcasting, 113 S. Ct. at 2710 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
167. Id. at 2709 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 2711 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
169. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 2710 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
171. Edge Broadcasting, 113 S. Ct. at 2710-11 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice
Stevens noted, "[t]he fact that the vast majority of the States currently sponsor a
lottery, and that soon virtually all of them will do so, does not, of course, preclude
an outlier State from following a different course and attempting to discourage its
citizens from partaking of such activities." Id. at 2711 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
172. Id. at 2710-11 (Stevens,J., dissenting). Thirty-four states and the District
of Columbia now sponsor a lottery. Id. at 2711 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Edge
Broadcasting opinion was written in 1993 and Justice Stevens acknowledged that
three more states in that year alone would be adding state-run lotteries. Id. (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting). Five of the 13 remaining states were considering implement-
25
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est in the action to be taken, the dissenters found the majority had
erred in upholding the constitutionality of sections 1304 and
1307.173
V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
Edge Broadcasting was the last of three commercial speech deci-
sions decided by the Supreme Court in 1993. In deciding Edge
Broadcasting, as in every commercial speech case, the Court applied
the four-factor Central Hudson analysis.1 74 Regarding the second
factor of the test, Justice White wrote that "we are quite sure that
the Government has a substantial interest in supporting the policy
of nonlottery States, as well as, not interfering with the policy of
States that permit lotteries." 175 The majority opinion relied on fed-
eral and state efforts dating back to the nineteenth century to sup-
port federal restrictions on lotteries and their "substantial interest"
in imposing them. 176 In doing so, however, Justice White over-
looked the current status of lotteries.177
Without citing evidence of contemporary lottery practices, the
majority simply stated that the federal government has a substantial
interest in maintaining its established policy of prohibiting lottery
advertisements in states that do not have lotteries. 78 The dissent
noted that this antiquated "no lottery" policy has been seriously
called into question by the growth in state-sponsored lotteries. 179
ing lotteries and Justice Stevens noted that by the end of the decade, all but Utah
and Nevada would have state-run lotteries. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
173. Id. at 2710-11 (StevensJ, dissenting). Justice Stevens was joined byJus-
tice Blackmun. Id. at 2708.
174. Id. at 2702. For a discussion of the Central Hudson test, see supra notes
10, 91-99 and accompanying text.
175. Id. at 2703.
176. Edge Broadcasting, 113 S. Ct. at 2700-01. Justice White wrote:
While lotteries have existed in this country since its founding, States have
long viewed them as a hazard to their citizens and to the public interest,
and have long engaged in legislative efforts to control this form of gam-
bling. Congress has, since the early 19th century, sought to assist the
States in controlling lotteries.
Id. at 2700.
177. For a general discussion of lotteries, see supra notes 42-76 and accompa-
nying text. For the number of state sponsored lotteries in the United States, see
supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
178. Edge Broadcasting, 113 S. Ct. at 2703-04. Justice Stevens wrote that the
majority, in contending that nonlottery states desired the assistance of the federal
government, made "an assumption . . .without any supporting evidence." Id. at
2709 (StevensJ., dissenting). For a discussion of the federal government's involve-
ment in lottery regulation, see supra notes 42-62 and accompanying text.
179. Id. at 2711 (Stevens, J., dissenting). For a discussion of the contempo-
rary status of state lotteries, see supra notes 171-72.
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Indeed, 1994 statistics indicate a three state growth in state lotteries
since Edge Broadcasting was decided in 1993, bringing the total of
state lotteries to thirty-seven.' 8 0 The Court's opinion relied on pre-
existing concepts of state interest in the lottery area. 181 Noticeably
absent was any re-evaluation of state interest in light of widespread
acceptance of lotteries.8 2
The Court did acknowledge the importance of the federal gov-
ernment's accommodation of the decision of a state to discourage
lottery participation, as well as, its accommodation of those states
sponsoring lotteries.1 83 An important distinction, however, must be
drawn between a government's ability to discourage a certain
activity and a government's power to eliminate the information
presented to its citizenry. As in Bigelow v. Virginia,184 in which the
Court invalidated a Virginia statute that regulated what Virginians
could see or read about New York services, Edge Broadcasting in-
volved what North Carolinians could hear about lawful Virginia
activities.' 85 Moreover, the nine county area reached by POWER
94's broadcasts receives much, if not all, of its media from Virginia-
based sources, all regularly advertising Virginia lottery promo-
tions. i8
6
Critics of the Edge Broadcasting majority argue this demon-
strated futility of applying the statutes to Edge Broadcasting.8 7 North
Carolinians know of the Virginia lottery and have had ample oppor-
tunity to obtain information about the lottery from Virginia me-
dia.'18  POWER 94 was just one more alternative for listeners. The
180. Greenberg, supra note 73.
181. Edge Broadcasting, 113 S. Ct. at 2710-11 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
182. Id. at 2711 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
183. Id. at 2703. The government can "discourage" any behavior it wishes,
but when the governmental interest becomes "substantial," then the government,
under the framework in Central Hudson, has the power to establish regulation ban-
ning commercial materials from reaching their population. The Supreme Court,
1985 Term-Leading Cases, 100 HARv. L. REv. 100, 180 (1986) (stating banning is
appropriate when state demonstrates substantiality of interest).
184. 421 U.S. 809 (1975). For a detailed discussion of Bigelow, see supra notes
84-86 and accompanying text.
185. Edge Broadcasting, 113 S. Ct. at 2710 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
186. Edge Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 732 F. Supp. 633, 635 (E.D. Va.
1990), aff'd, 5 F.3d 59 (4th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 2696 (1993).
187. Henry J. Bourgignon, The United States Supreme Court and the Freedom of
Expression-October Term 1992, 15 Hum. RTs. L.J. No. 4-6, 137, 148 (1994) (affected
North Carolina area already bombarded by Virginia lottery making statute enforce-
ment ineffective).
188. Edge Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 5 F.3d 59, 62 (4th Cir. 1992),
rev'&d 113 S. Ct. 2696 (1993). The court of appeals wrote that POWER 94's poten-
tial audience was "inundated with Virginia lottery advertisements." Id. This bor-
der region of North Carolina relies substantially on Virginia media consisting of
27
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enforcement of the statutes succeeded only in making Edge less
profitable by forcing the station to forfeit millions of dollars in prof-
its derived from Virginia lottery advertisements. 18 9
In its holding, the Court cited Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v.
Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico.190 The Court found similarities in Edge
Broadcasting and Posadas because both cases concerned the restric-
tion of gambling advertisements and the established status of gam-
bling as a "vice" activity. 191 In Posadas, the Court wrote that "the
disruption of the moral and cultural patterns, the increase in local
crime, the fostering of prostitution, the development of corruption,
and the infiltration of organized crime" have compelled the vast
majority of the fifty states to prohibit gambling.'92 The govern-
ment's interest in protecting its citizens' well being, according to
the Court, unquestionably comprises a "substantial" governmental
interest.193
The fact that thirty-seven states currently sponsor lotteries di-
minishes the Court's position that North Carolina's policy against
gambling is worthy of protection at the expense of truthful com-
mercial speech. The United States does not have a general interest
in restricting state-run lotteries. It is a North Carolina policy to dis-
courage lottery participation.1 94 The Court should not recognize
North Carolina's policy of discouraging lottery participation be-
cause it is not a substantial federal interest.
Addressing the third factor of the Central Hudson test, the
Court concluded that the regulation did directly advance the gov-
ernment's substantial interest.' 95 Because of the unique facts of
Edge Broadcasting, the Court's determination appears to questiona-
bly serve the governmental interest. 19 6 The Court concluded that
because the 127,000 North Carolinians who reside in the broadcast
area will not be able to hear lottery advertisements, the governmen-
two large Virginia newspapers, as well as, four television stations. Edge Broadcast-
ing Co. v. United States, 732 F. Supp. 633, 635 (E.D. Va. 1990), aff'd, 5 F.3d 59
(4th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 2696 (1993).
189. Edge Broadcasting, 5 F.2d at 62.
190. 478 U.S. 328 (1986). For a further discussion of Posadas, see supra notes
100-03 and accompanying text.
191. Edge Broadcasting, 113 S. Ct. at 2703.
192. Posadas, 478 U.S. at 341 (citation omitted).
193. Id.
194. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
195. Edge Broadcasting, 113 S. Ct. at 2704.
196. Id.
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tal interest was fulfilled. 197 However, allowing POWER 94 to air lot-
tery advertisements would increase the amount of radio time
containing lottery advertisements in the affected region by only
eleven percent. In fact, the court of appeals went so far as to say
that Edge's potential audience was "inundated with Virginia's lot-
tery advertisements."
198
By upholding the ban on POWER 94's ability to broadcast lot-
tery advertisements, the Court only "marginally" advanced the
State's interests. The marginal advancement of the governmental
interest contravened the Court's statement in Central Hudson that
"conditional and remote eventualities simply cannot justify silenc-
ing..., promotional advertising."' 99
However, in Edge Broadcasting, the Supreme Court stated that it
does not "require that the Government make progress on every
front before it can make progress on any front."200 Seemingly, the
Court disregarded the language of Central Hudson and allowed "lim-
ited incremental support for the [government's asserted] interest,"
here a minimal decrease in the amount of lottery advertising, to
justify its infringement upon basic First Amendment rights. 201
In acknowledging that North Carolinians were exposed to, and
aware of, lottery activities in Virginia, the Court analogized the lot-
tery situation to the issues surrounding cigarette advertisement.
202
Cigarette advertising is banned, but as the Court stated, "it could
hardly have [been] believed that this regulation would keep the
public wholly ignorant of the availability of cigarettes."
20 3
197. Id. at 2706z07. Enough residents of the nine county area in North Caro-
lina listen to POWER 94 so as to account for 11% of all radio time in the broadcast
area. Id. at 2706.
198. Edge Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 5 F.3d 59, 62 (4th Cir. 1992),
rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 2696 (1993). This border region of North Carolina relies substan-
tially on Virginia media consisting of two large Virginia newspapers, as well as, four
Virginia television stations.
199. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,
569 (1980).
200. Edge Broadcasting, 113 S. Ct. at 2707.
201. Edge Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 732 F. Supp. 633, 640 (E.D. Va.
1990), affd, 5 F.3d 59 (4th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 2696 (1993).
202. Edge Broadcasting, 113 S. Ct. at 2707. Evidence of the harmful effects of
cigarette smoking was available since early in the 1930's, however, upon the Sur-
geon General's release of a report in 1964 linking cigarette smoking with major
health hazards the government took serious steps to regulate cigarettes. Peter
F. Riley, The Product Liability of the Tobacco Industry: Has Cipollone v. Liggett Group
Finally Pierced the Cigarette Manufacturers' Aura of Invincibility?, 30 B.C. L. REv. 1103
(1989) (discussing Surgeon General's 1964 report and subsequent federal
response).
203. Edge Broadcasting, 113 S. Ct. at 2707.
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The majority stressed that under the Constitution, commercial
speech that promotes a legislatively determined undesirable activity
can be restricted because "[i]f there is an immediate connection
between advertising and demand, and the federal regulation de-
creases advertising, it stands to reason that the policy of decreasing
demand for [the activity] is correspondingly advanced."20 4 Because
the Court did not provide a substantive test for the evaluation of
whether certain regulations actually advanced a substantial state in-
terest, the Court left commercial speech proponents unsure of
their First Amendment standing.
The Edge Broadcasting Court stated that there was "no doubt
that the fit in the case [between the regulation and the state inter-
est] was a reasonable one."20 5 Allowing POWER 94 to broadcast
Virginia lottery advertisements into North Carolina would erode
the policy of North Carolina, the nonlottery state, in effectuating its
practice of discouraging gambling.206 The approach mandated by
the statutes is a "bright line" test: because POWER 94 broadcasts
from a North Carolina location, it is not permitted to air lottery
advertisements. 20 7 The statutes rely on the geographic boundaries
of the states, "under which a station's right to broadcast lottery ad-
vertisements hinge on the State [in which] it is licensed."208
The statutes suffer from not being narrowly tailored to the gov-
emment's purpose. The statutes focus only on the state in which
the station is licensed, without considering the physical location of
the entity broadcasting the advertisements, the reach of its signal or
the audience receiving the broadcasts. 2°9 The audience receiving
the station's broadcasts is 92.2% Virginia residents, with only 7.8%
of the potential listeners of the radio station from North Caro-
lina.2 10 The bright line character of the statutes make them more
conducive to application, but they fail the narrow tailoring require-
ment of the Central Hudson fourth prong. Broadcasting, where a
204. Id.
205. Id. at 2705.
206. Id. at 2704-05.
207. In bright line analysis, a Justice advocates the party who has proved a set
of facts putting them within certain boundaries of the rule. James G. Wilson, The
Morality of Formalism, 33 UCLA L. REv. 431, 435 (1985). Bright line rules are hard
to alter, requiring an overruling, a strained distinction, or a constitutional amend-
ment. Id.
208. Brief for the Petitioner at 2, United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 113
S. Ct. 2696 (1993) (No. 92-486).
209. Brief for the Respondent at 59, United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co.,
113 S. Ct. 2696 (1993) (No. 92-486).
210. Edge Broadcasting, 113 S. Ct. at 2702.
[Vol. II: p. 127
30
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 2, Iss. 1 [1995], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol2/iss1/6
1995] VICE OR VICTIM OF THE COMMERCIAL SPEECH DOCTRINE? 157
signal located in one city may be directed primarily toward one city
or area, does not recognize the definite lines of state boundaries;
it involves transmissions that cross boundaries and borders
regularly.21'
The Court determined that the federal statutes reasonably sat-
isfy the interests of lottery and nonlottery states without infringing
upon the interests of either one.212 In the broader context, how-
ever, the Court must consider the First Amendment protection af-
forded commercial speech.213 Banning a truthful, nonmisleading
advertisement of a legal activity goes against the Constitution's
presumption in favor of more, rather than less, speech and the es-
tablished theory that an educated, informed populous is more de-
sirable than one traveling in a state of "government-induced
ignorance." 214
In making its determination, the Court rejected what it charac-
terized as "the piecemeal approach" utilized by the lower courts in
deciding Edge Broadca.sting. Rather, it determined the validity of the
restriction as it applied on the national level.21 5 This approach was
dictated by the Court's desire to avoid any station-by-station analysis
of the reasonableness of the congressional scheme.216 Looking at
each case would require courts to employ a heightened level of
scrutiny in determining the reasonableness and fit of the rule to
each individual set of facts.2 17 According to the Court, the "step-
child" status of commercial speech rebuts the appropriateness of
heightened scrutiny in any commercial speech context.2 18
211. Brief for the Respondent at 59, United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co.,
113 S. Ct. 2696 (1993) (No. 92-486).
212. Edgce Broadcasting, 113 S. Ct. at 2705-06.
213. See Faille, supra note 99, at 58 (Court's recent jurisprudence guarantees
random results).
214. Edge Broadcasting, 113 S. Ct. at 2710 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In Whitney
v. California, Justice Brandeis stated:
To courageous, self-reliant men, with confidence in the power of free and
fearless reasoning applied through the processes of popular government,
no danger flowing from speech can be deemed clear and present, unless
the incidence of the evil apprehended is so imminent that it may befall
before there is opportunity for full discussion. If there be time to expose
through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the
processes of education, the remedy to be applied is more speech, not
enforced silence. Only an emergency can justify such repression.
274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927).
215. Edge Broadcasting, 113 S. Ct. at 2707-08.
216. Brief for the Petitioner at 39, United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co.,
113 S. Ct. 2696 (1993) (No. 92-486).
217. Id. at 40.
218. Edge Broadcasting, 113 S. Ct. at 2703. In Edge Broadcasting, the Court dis-
cussed the lesser protection afforded commercial speech. Id. In First Amendment
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This notion of commercial speech's secondary status was not
supported in another 1993 Court decision, Discovery Network, which
made it more difficult for the government to regulate advertising,
sending a message of strong protectionism over commercial speech
rights. 21 9 In his Edge Broadcasting dissent, Justice Stevens noted that
the Court overlooked Discovery Network220 An earlier Supreme
Court decision in Bigelow v. Virginia,221 which struck down a state
ban on the dissemination of truthful information of another state's
activities and rejected informational protectionism, was also over-
looked by the Edge Broadcasting majority. 22 2
VI. IMPACT
The Supreme Court's three decisions regarding commercial
speech in the 1993 term suggest inconsistency in the application of
the commercial speech doctrine. The two decisions prior to Edge
Broadcasting imply increased protection in the Supreme Court's
First Amendment protection of commercial speech. Edge Broadcast-
ing, however, is viewed as a "setback to unfettered commercial
speech." 223 Edge Broadcasting sharply curtailed the augmented com-
mercial protections advanced by the Court in both Discovery Network
and Fane.224
The Court's broad application of the statutes at issue has seri-
ous implications. Such analysis could justify regulating advertising
of activity that may be considered to be hazardous to its consumers.
The Edge Broadcasting Court determined that a commercial activity,
carrying with it some negative societal implications such as gam-
bling, deserves less protection than other forms of speech.225 Ex-
tending this line of reasoning, it would therefore seem possible that
jurisprudence, commercial speech has been traditionally viewed as the "stepchild
of the first amendment." Sam J. Ervin, Advertising: Stepchild of the First Amendment,
Address Before the Proprietary Association, White Sulphur Springs, W. Va. (May 16,
1972), in ADVERTISING'S RoLE IN SocrETY, at 326-31 (1. Wright & J. Mertis eds.,
1974). For a more recent discussion of commercial speech's "stepchild" status, see
Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who's Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L. REV.
627, 652 (1990).
219. MacLachlan, supra note 6, at 1 (noting recent Court cases add to com-
mercial speech protection). See also High Court Strikes Down Cincinnati News-Rack
Ban, STAR T~M., Mar. 25, 1993, at A6.
220. Edge Broadcasting, 113 S. Ct. at 2708 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
221. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
222. Edge Broadcasting, 113 S. Ct. at 2709 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
223. MacLachlan, supra note 6, at 1.
224. Edenfield v. Fane, 113 S. Ct. 1792 (1993). For a more detailed discus-
sion of Discovery Network and Fane, see supra notes 109-20 and accompanying text.
225. Edge Broadcasting, 113 S. Ct. at 2703.
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the Court, in the future, may go so far as to permit bans on the
advertising of high fat or high sugar foods, the consumption of
which may be viewed negatively by a more health conscious public.
As one scholar notes, "[t]he ultimate question here actually
goes to the very heart of the First Amendment: To what extent can
the government assume people are better off with less speech and
thus less information?"226 The most disturbing aspect of the
Court's opinion is that it allows a sweeping ban on truthful informa-
tion regarding legal activities in a neighboring state. Strong convic-
tions regarding lotteries and their effects on communities may have
prompted the Court to decide Edge Broadcasting in the manner in
which it did.
In supporting a ban on lottery advertisements in Edge Broadcast-
ing, the Supreme Court relied less on significant factors of the Cen-
tral Hudson test and comparable precedent, but more on the
traditional view of the regulated activity.2 27 Elected officials have
no claim to a unique brand of wisdom that enables them to deter-
mine what constitutes information that is suitable for public con-
sumption. In Edge Broadcasting, the Court allowed the government
to act as "educator for the masses, able to determine the thoughts,
feelings, desires, preferences and dreams of the people."22 8 Gov-
ernment exercised paternalism has no position in a society that is
constantly bombarded with information, both positive and nega-
tive. In Edge Broadcasting, not only the lottery lost, but more impor-
tantly, protections afforded commercial speech lost.
Lauraj Schiller
226. Chemerinsky, supra note 110, at 66.
227. Edge Broadcasting, 113 S. Ct. at 2700-01.
228. Bourguignon, supra note 187, at 148.
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